Compliance and Remedies Against Non-Compliance Under the WTO System
Towards A More Balanced Regime for All Members
Project on Dispute Settlement Series • Issue Paper 3
Enforcement of dispute settlement rulings has been strengthened since the establishment of the WTO; even so, available options for retaliation arguably seem to be geared more towards re-balancing the level of concessions rather than inducing compliance with Member obligations. Moreover, the smaller the economy and the narrower the trade basket, the slimmer the opportunity to find a sector to retaliate against without adversely affecting the domestic market. In this context, the present study argues that as long as retaliation is the only remedy, and that the system does not provide adequate opportunity or incentives for disputing parties to agree on meaningful compensation, only larger economies will be in a position to impose ‘effective’ retaliation. The study explores ways in which to make Panel and Appellate Body reports more conducive to compliance to advance the position of developing countries by enabling them to retaliate efficiently against a stronger trading partner.